Troubles with Hiibel: How the Court Inverted the Relationship between Citizens and the State by Fennel, John A. & Sobel, Richard
1TROUBLES WITH HIIBEL: 
How the Court Inverted the Relationship Between 
Citizens and the State.
Richard Sobel* and John A. Fennel†
Abstract 
This essay shows why the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada 
violates precedent, the Constitution, and the very basis 
for the relationship between government and the 
governed.  First, the Court has violated the clear limits 
Terry v. Ohio set on the restricted searches based on 
reasonable suspicion within the restrictions of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  By using the power of 
the state to compel citizens to produce identification, it 
also violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments 
as well as the unenumerated rights that conceptually 
link the enumerated rights in the Court’s 
jurisprudence.  Finally, this country was founded on 
the belief that government has to justify itself to the 
citizens, and the Hiibel decision inverts this 
relationship.  To rectify these transgressions, we argue 
that the Court should return to the bright-line rule 
articulated in Terry: The officer may ask; the suspect 
may remain silent. 
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“Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, 
if the police can pick him up whenever they do not 
 like the cut of his jib, if they can ‘seize’ and ‘search’ 
him in their discretion, we enter a new regime”  
(Terry v. Ohio, 1968)1
I. Introduction 
Can the state, on the basis of reasonable suspicion—a standard 
lower than probable cause2—arrest citizens for not identifying 
themselves?  According to Hiibel v. Nevada County, the answer is 
yes, if state statute authorizes it.3 Now the police can, with the power 
of the law, compel citizens to identify themselves or face punishment.  
With this decision, the Supreme Court has changed the relationship 
between the citizens and the state, turning the justification for our 
Constitution upside-down.   
This paper argues that, while the Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
issues are sufficient to show that Nevada’s stop and identify statute is 
unconstitutional, the mutually reinforcing nature of the First, Fourth, 
and Fifth Amendments provides a coherent and compelling basis for 
overturning the law and for understanding the relationship between 
the citizen and the state under our Constitution.  To that end, the 
Second section gives the facts of Hiibel and sketches the arguments to 
follow.  The Third section discusses the limitations on pre-Hiibel 
police interrogatories under Terry and how the Hiibel decision ignores 
 
1 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (J. Douglas, dissent).   
2 See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth 
Amendment on the Streets 75 COR. L. REV. 1258, 1332-1333 (1999) (contending 
that there is “no way to meaningfully articulate a standard between probable cause 
and arbitrariness.”); See also Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the 
Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable 
Suspicion 60 OHSLJ 99, 99-102 (1999) (discussing the “incoherent and inconsistent 
caselaw” for determining the influence of a neighborhood in determining whether or 
not a suspects behavior can be characterized as “reasonably suspicious.”); See also 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 232 (1983) ("The concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not 
'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'”); 
3 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, Humboldt County, 124 S.Ct 2451 
(2004).   
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those standards.  The Fourth section considers the limitations on 
unconstitutionally vague statutes under Kolender4 and the failure of 
Nevada’s stop and identify statute to meet those standards.  The Fifth 
section shows how the Court’s transgression of both Terry and 
Kolender in Hiibel effectively gives the police license to make a Terry 
stop an identification checkpoint.  By legitimizing identity 
checkpoints, as the paper develops those violations in the Sixth 
section, the Hiibel decision runs afoul of First Amendment 
protections manifesting themselves in unenumerated rights the Court 
has already recognized.   
Furthermore, we consider the philosophical underpinnings of the 
Constitution as manifested in the Court’s previous rulings on 
unenumerated rights to support finding Nevada’s stop and identify 
statue unconstitutional because it reverses the relationship between 
state and citizen the Court’s jurisprudence hitherto sought to retain.  
In the Conclusion we contend that restoring the bright-line rule from 
Terry will return the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment protections 
that Nevada’s stop and identify statute violates: The police may 
question, but the suspect may remain silent.  Any rule giving police 
the authority to arrest on the basis of silence without probable cause 
reverses the relationship between citizens and the state by requiring 
citizens to assist the police to their own possible detriment.  As Hiibel 
has reversed the relationship between citizens and the state, this 
change requires the Court to reverse its course.  
 
II. Background to Hiibel 
 
This fundamental change in the relationship between citizens and 
the state had its budding in rural Nevada.  On May 21, 2000, 
Humboldt County Sheriff’s Deputy Lee Dove responded to a report of 
an alleged assault: that a man driving a truck was seen hitting a 
woman passenger.5 Following the witness’s report, Dove found 
Dudley Hiibel standing on the passenger side of the road beside a 
GMC pick-up truck.6 As he walked up to Hiibel, Dove said that he 
 
4 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
5 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2455.  See also http://papersplease.org/hiibel/video.html (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2006) (offering a video of Hiibel’s arrest).  In fact, the video 
indicates that the daughter was driving (and the record suggests that she hit her 
father.) 
6 Id.
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had a report of a fight, and Hiibel said he did not know about a fight.7
Dove then asked Hiibel if he had “any identification on [him],” and 
Hiibel said he did not.8 Hiibel was asked eleven times for 
identification, and he refused each time.9 Between requests, Hiibel 
asked Dove if he was being charged with anything, if he was illegally 
parked, and suggested arresting him.10 Hiibel then said something 
that cannot be discerned from the transcript, and Dove replied that “It 
could be a searchable situation.”  Eventually, Dove threatened to 
arrest Hiibel if he did not produce any identification.11 Hiibel 
unwaveringly refused to provide identification and was arrested.12 
The State of Nevada charged Hiibel with delaying Dove in the 
execution of his official duties, a misdemeanor.13 Hiibel was so 
charged because he allegedly violated Nevada’s “stop and identify” 
statute, which requires persons detained under reasonable suspicion to 
identify themselves:   
1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the 
officer encounters under circumstances which 
reasonably indicate that the person has committed, 
is committing or is about to commit a crime.  
….. 
3.  The officer may detain the person pursuant to this 
section only to ascertain his identity and the 
suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence 
abroad.     Any person so detained shall identify 
himself, but may not be compelled to answer any 
other inquiry of any peace officer.14 
Hiibel challenged his arrest all the way to the United States 
Supreme Court, eventually losing his constitutional challenge to 
Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute.  In its ruling, the Court decided 
5 to 4 that arresting Hiibel for failing to identify himself while 
detained under reasonable suspicion for assault does not violate the 
Fourth or Fifth Amendments.  Unfortunately, this ruling neither 
comports with past Supreme Court precedents nor with the 
fundamental justification for our democratic government. 
 
7 Id. 
8 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at  2455.   
9 Id.
10 Id. 
11 See supra note 5, Hiibel video.   
12 124 S.Ct. at  2455.  
13 Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 199.280 (2003). 
14 Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 171.123 (2003). 
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In recounting the arrest, the Court notes that Dove asked Hiibel 
for some identification, “which we understand as a request to produce 
a driver's license or some other form of written identification.”15 
Later, the Court states that, following the Nevada Supreme Court, the 
stop and identify “statute does not require a suspect to give the officer 
a driver's license or any other document. Provided that the suspect 
either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other 
means—a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute 
is satisfied and no violation occurs.”16 Discussing the reasons behind 
Hiibel’s refusal to identify himself, the Court states that “[a]s best we 
can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only because he thought 
his name was none of the officer’s business,”17 suggesting that a 
weighing of Hiibel’s reason’s against those of law enforcement is in 
order.   
There is, however, nothing about Terry that allows for such a 
weighing exercise; instead, Terry simply gives police the right to ask 
question that the suspect need not answer and conduct a limited 
physical search for weapon if the officer has reason to think the 
suspect is armed.  Importantly, this physical search does not aid the 
police in their investigation; rather, it is to preserve the officer’s 
safety during the questioning Terry authorizes.18 Moreover, basic 
constitutional considerations about the structure of our government do 
not require that citizens justify themselves to police on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion.  Since the Court cannot tell what Deputy Dove 
asked Hiibel to produce—his name or written identification—it 
comes as no surprise that the Court made a decision that does not 
comport with the dicta from the unanimous Berkemer Court19 as well 
as concurrences from Terry and other opinions. 20 Ignoring the dicta 
 
15 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2455. 
16 Id. at 2457. 
17 Id. at 2461. 
18 Infra at 10-12. 
19 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (An “officer may ask the 
[Terry] detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try 
to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. But the 
detainee is not obliged to respond.").   
20 Illinois v. Wardlow, 538 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (stating that stopping a fleeing 
suspect “is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to 
stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.”); Kolander v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (stating that a Terry suspect “must be free to leave after a 
short time and to decline to answer the questions put to him.”) (J. Brennan, 
concurring); Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (J. White, concurring) (“However, given 
the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person may 
be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him. Of 
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and concurrences from these earlier decisions has led the Court to 
violate their longstanding interpretation of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.  
On the grounds of reasonable suspicion, arresting a suspect for 
refusing a request for a name violates the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment protections established under Terry and Kolender.
According to White’s concurrence in Terry,21 reiterated by the Court 
in Berkemer, “[o]f course, the person stopped is not obliged to 
answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer 
furnishes no basis for an arrest,”22 because of the Fifth Amendment’s 
protections against self incrimination.23 Furthermore, under 
Brennan’s concurrence in Kolender, a statute may not require a 
suspect to provide “credible and reliable” identification, for in doing 
so the statute would circumvent Fourth Amendment protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures; specifically, allowing an 
arrest to occur on less than probable cause, the long held standard for 
taking someone into custody.24 A requirement for “credible and 
reliable” information in a stop and identify statute allows the police to 
arrest a suspect who fails to meet a standard the Court hitherto held 
only to apply to probable cause.25 While Nevada’s stop and identify 
statute was interpreted by the Court to require a suspect only to 
provide a name, if there is any question about the suspect’s name then 
the statute becomes pretext for demanding more reliable 
identification, creating the same violations as in Kolender.
For example, the police are unlikely to believe a suspect who 
claims his name is ‘John Doe’.  Under the cover of Nevada’s stop and 
identify statute the police cannot use the threat of arrest to elicit proof 
that the suspect’s name is correct without transgressing the 
 
course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, 
and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the 
officer to the need for continued observation.”). 
21 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (J. White, concurring). 
22 Id. 
23 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (explaining that the non-threatening nature of the 
Terry stops—no threat of arrest for not responding to the officer’s questions—is the 
reasoning behind not worrying about Fifth Amendment protections).   
24 See Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National 
Identification Systems 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH 319, 383, note 360 (discussing Justice 
William Brennan’s concurrence in Kolender).   
25 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 367-68 (J. Brennan, concurring) (“[I]t goes without saying 
that arrest and the threat of a criminal sanction have a substantial impact on interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, far more severe than we have ever permitted 
on less than probable cause.”). 
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prohibitions from Kolender against the compelled production of 
“credible and reliable” identification.  To expect a citizen with a name 
like ‘John Doe’ to assert his right under Kolender against the 
compelled production of “credible and reliable” identification under 
the threat of arrest is to substitute Panglossian optimism26 for policy: 
The bright-line rule must be drawn on the side of restricting police 
power.     
But the clear violations of Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence from Kolender and Terry is just part of the Court’s error 
in Hiibel. Under the penumbra cast by the First Amendment, there 
are rights citizens have that are necessary for exercising of the right 
specified by that amendment.  A forteriori, maintaining liberty 
requires more than just the rights enumerated in the Constitution; 
liberty and the enumerated rights also require privacy.  Without 
privacy, there are chilling effects on liberty because of the 
repercussion for proponent of unpopular views.  Likewise, without 
privacy, the extension of Fourth Amendment protections to phone 
tapping in Katz27 does not make sense.  Privacy as a penumbral rights 
is the factor that both justifies and protects liberty as well as 
undergirding the enumerated rights in constitutional jurisprudence.  
For example, the Due Process clause has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to allow the right for unmarried couples to use 
contraception, a consequence of recognizing a right to privacy.28 
Likewise, as we shall argue, the right to freedom of expression 
requires that the government allow people to move about without 
disclosing their identity unless the state has a compelling interest.  
Unenumerated privacy is the right that underlies many of the rights 
actually enumerated in the Constitution, for without privacy there is 
no freedom of expression, liberty, or protection against unreasonable 
search.  
By excluding a name from those things covered by privacy, the 
state enhances its power to require a person to justify herself to 
government instead of it constituting an entity that proves its worth to 
 
26 VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (John Butt, trans., Penguin Books 1947). 
27 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the government’s 
electronic listening to the defendant’s conversation on a public telephone booth 
violate the defendant’s privacy); overruling the physical intrusion test of Olmstead 
v. United States and affirming the right to privacy.   277 U.S. 438, 478 (J. Brandeis, 
dissenting) (“[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men.”). 
28 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
TROUBLES WITH HIIBEL 
 
8
citizens: This thereby undermines the very premise upon which our 
country was founded as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution—to 
“secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”  The 
Bill of Rights affords persons in the United States certain protections 
against the government.  Before Terry, the probable cause 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment was the level of justification 
necessary for the state to seize and search someone.   
Now, the state does not need this justification.  Under reasonable 
suspicion, the state can now arrest someone for not providing a name.  
Instead of being left alone until the state has the justification 
necessary to interfere, citizens can now be questioned by police and 
arrested for not volunteering information.  Without probable cause, 
the state can arrest citizens who do not provide what it desires.  We 
can no longer live free from unwanted government inference.  Simply 
not giving the state what it wants—something the state has not proved 
it needs to the standards of the Fourth Amendment—can lead to an 
arrest.  To stay out of jail we must do what the state wants, reversing 
the relationship between the government and the people as conceived 
at the founding. 
 
III. Pre-Hiibel Terry Stops 
 
In Terry, the Supreme Court ruled that police need not have 
probable cause to seize a person.29 Instead, Terry allowed police to 
briefly detain a suspect on the basis of “reasonable suspicion.”30 The 
concerns that motivated the Court to curtail requirements for probable 
cause stemmed from the state’s interest in “effective crime prevention 
and detection,” the interest that motivated the police officer in 
Hiibel.31 By recognizing the need for “swift action predicated upon 
on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically 
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subject to the 
warrant procedure,”32 the Court has allowed states to pass laws that 
enable the police, with reasonable suspicion, to use “the least 
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s 
suspicion in a short period of time.”33 
29 Terry, 392 U.S. 1. 
30 Id.
31 Id. at 22.   
32 Id. at 20.   
33 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).   
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What constitutes “the least intrusive means reasonably available 
to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time” is 
defined by the situation.  Actions officer can undertake on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion are limited by the Fourth Amendment.34 In 
Terry, the officer in question “took hold of [petitioner] and patted 
down the outer surfaces of his clothing” to search for a weapon.35 
The officer executing the frisk was concerned with more than “the 
government interest in investigating the crime,” and the Court took 
this into consideration by expressing worries about “the police officer 
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing 
is not armed with a weapon that could be unexpectedly and fatally 
used against him.”36 To meet the officer’s interest in safety, the Court 
held that when there is reasonable suspicion, “the proper balance that 
has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there 
must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for 
weapons for the protection of the police officer.”37 
The Court defined reasonable suspicion as “whether a reasonably 
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 
that his safety or that of others was in danger.”38 Assuming this 
antecedent condition is in place, the Court then explored the 
“reasonable search” allowed by constitutional protections.  The Court 
acknowledged that, like the determination that there is reasonable 
suspicion, a reasonable search is also dependent on “the concrete 
factual circumstances of individual cases.”39 Such a search must “be 
confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably defined to discover guns, 
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police 
officer.”40 For example, extending the Terry analysis to other 
situations, the Court has concluded that if, during the cursory search, 
the officer finds what feels like drugs, the officer cannot then compel 
the suspect to produce the suspected drugs: “Nothing in Terry can be 
understood to allow a generalized ‘cursory search for weapons’ or, 
indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons.”41 
34 Id. at 499-500.   
35 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. 
36 Id. at 23.  
37 Id. at 27 (emphasis added.) 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 29. 
40 Id. 
41 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979).  See also Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1979) (“Thus, Terry departed from traditional Fourth 
Amendment analysis in two respects.  First, it defined a special category of Fourth 
Amendment ‘seizures’ so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general 
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Thus a Terry stop allows for a brief weapons search that is 
predicated on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that a crime is afoot 
and confined to cursory measures to ensure the officer’s safety.  
Subsequent opinions affirmed these limitations: In Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, the Court ruled that Terry frisks instigated for purposes 
other than safety are illegitimate.42 Any evidence obtained outside the 
scope of a search authorized by Terry is inadmissible unless that 
evidence falls under the “plain-view” doctrine, meaning that if the 
evidence is found through a frisk for weapons and, while not a 
weapon, is unmistakable contraband, that evidence is admissible.43 
So expanding the scope of the search in a Terry stop requires 
 
rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ reasonable 
could be replaced by a balancing test. Second, the application of this balancing test 
led the Court to approve this narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on grounds less 
rigorous than probable cause, but only for the purpose of a pat-down for 
weapons.”);  U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1974) (“In Terry v. Ohio,
the Court declined expressly to decide whether facts not amounting to probable 
cause could justify an ‘investigative seizure’ short of an arrest, but it approved a 
limited search--a pat-down for weapons--for the protection of an officer 
investigating suspicious behavior of persons he reasonably believed to be armed and 
dangerous. The Court approved such a search on facts that did not constitute 
probable cause to believe the suspects guilty of a crime, requiring only that 'the 
police officer . . . be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' a belief that 
his safety or that of others is in danger.”) (citations omitted). 
42 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (“Under the State Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
record before it, it is clear that the court was correct in holding that the police 
officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the ‘strictly circumscribed’ search for 
weapons allowed under Terry. Where, as here, ‘an officer who is executing a valid 
search for one item seizes a different item,’ this Court rightly ‘has been sensitive to 
the danger ... that officers will enlarge a specific authorization, furnished by a 
warrant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and 
seize at will.’ Here, the officer's continued exploration of respondent's pocket after 
having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to ‘[t]he sole 
justification of the search [under Terry] ... the protection of the police officer and 
others nearby.’  It therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry 
expressly refused to authorize, and that we have condemned in subsequent cases.”) 
(citations omitted). 
43 Id. (“We think that this doctrine has an obvious application by analogy to cases 
in which an officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an 
otherwise lawful search.  The rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that if 
contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful 
vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and 
thus no ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment--or at least no search 
independent of the initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point.”). 
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disregarding the Court’s previous holding that a Terry stop is simply a 
narrow search for weapons predicate upon the officer’s safety.44 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence makes this point clear: “Concealed 
weapons create an immediate and severe danger to the public, and 
though that danger might not warrant routine general weapons checks, 
 
44 While Tracey Maclin argues that the Terry rationale has been expanded to cover a 
variety of searches beyond safety, each of the cases he enumerates rests on different 
grounds: Minnesota v. Dickenson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (holding that police may 
seize contraband found in a Terry frisk that is distinguishable as contraband through 
the Terry search alone because such evidence falls under plain-feel, a doctrine 
analogous to the plain-view doctrine); Alabama v. White 496 U.S 325 (1990) 
(holding that anonymous tip constituted reasonable suspicion for a stop that resulted 
in a consensual search); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment allows for a protective sweep of a residence where an arrest 
occurs when the officers have reasonable suspicion that there are others present in 
the resident who could pose a threat to the officers’ safety); United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (fitting a “drug courier profile” constitutes reasonable 
suspicion);  New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (holding that while an officer 
removing papers obscuring a vehicle identification number was a search under the 
Fourth Amendment, a weapon in plain view observed during the search could be 
admitted as evidence); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) (acknowledging 
an open question as to whether all fingerprinting is prohibited, stating that there “is 
thus support in our cases for the view that the Fourth Amendment would permit 
seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is reasonable suspicion that the 
suspect has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis for believing that 
fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime, and 
if the procedure is carried out with dispatch.”  The Court held that the fingerprinting 
violated the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Hensley, 469 
U.S. 221 (1985) (allowing the seizure of evidence in plain-view seen after a 
legitimate Terry stop); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the 
school environment allows for searches on less than probable cause); Florida v. 
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that even if the suspect was seized under 
Terry the search was consensual, so the evidence could be admitted); United States 
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (allowing a canine “sniff test” on the basis of 
less reasonable suspicion because the sniff test is sui generis, only indicating the 
presence of illegal drugs, and does “not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.”); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (holding that 
the search of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle during a Terry stop for 
the officers’ safety is reasonable); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) 
(holding that officers executing a valid search warrant on a resident can seize the 
person who lives in the residence while the search is conducted);  Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (ruling that the officer’s auto stop and Terry frisk were 
reasonable).  See Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than 
the Disease 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1994) (“Predictably, [the Terry] narrow 
exception has been stretched and distorted so that government intrusions are now 
permitted in a variety of contexts that have nothing to do with the safety of patrol 
officers or the circumstances at issue in Terry.”) (citation omitted).      
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it could well warrant action on less than a ‘probability’.”45 Harlan’s 
line of thought contends that “[o]nce that first encounter was justified, 
however, the officer’s right to take suitable measures for his own 
safety followed automatically.”46 The majority holding affirms these 
limits:  
We merely hold that where a police officer observes 
unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably 
conclude in the light of his experience that criminal 
activity may be afoot and that the person he is dealing 
with may be armed and presently dangerous… …he is 
entitled for protection of himself and others in the area 
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer 
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover 
weapons which might be used to assault him.47 
The point that the search authorized by Terry is limited to 
weapons for the officer’s safety is further established by considering 
what was at issue between the justices in the decision itself.  In his 
dissent, Justice Douglas argues against allowing any kind of detention 
under reasonable suspicion, contending that  
it is a mystery how that "search" and that "seizure" can 
be constitutional by Fourth Amendment standards, 
unless there was "probable cause" to believe that (1) a 
crime had been committed or (2) a crime was in the 
process of being committed or (3) a crime was about to 
be committed.48 
Considering the majority opinion against the dissent makes apparent 
that the Court’s major concern was how to allow the police officer’s 
physical search in Terry while upholding the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Court did this by predicating the search on the 
officer’s safety and limiting the search to weapons that might threaten 
the officer’s safety.  The searches Terry allows are justified by police 
safety during the encounter and limited to weapons that threaten 
safety; any extension of the scope of allowable searches goes beyond 
what Terry allows.  Furthermore, there never was any contemplation 
that the suspect could be compelled to answer any question the officer 
asks during the encounter.    
 
45 Terry, 392 U. S. at 31-31.  (J. Harlan, concurring).   
46 Id. at 34. (J. Harlan, concurring).  
47 Terry, 392 U.S. 30 (emphasis added).   
48 Id. at 35 (dissent, J. Douglas). 
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In comparing Terry to Hiibel, the first elision in the Court’s 
opinion is the complete disconnect between the types of searches 
allowed by each case.  The Hiibel Court acknowledges that Justice 
White, concurring in Terry, stated that “a person detained in an 
investigative stop can be questioned but is ‘not obliged to answer, 
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no 
basis for an arrest’.”49 In Hiibel, the petitioner is arrested for not 
giving his name.  However, the Court maintained that Terry did not 
foreclose the question of whether a person detained under reasonable 
suspicion may be compelled by arrest to supply a name.50 
First, the Court rejects the view of Justice White, contending that 
the threat of arrest is necessary to prevent the request for a name from 
“becom[ing] a legal nullity.”51 The Court’s concern to avoid a legal 
nullity oversteps their prior affirmation of Justice White in the 
unanimous Berkemer Court,52 Royer,53 and Davis54 held to comprise 
the constitutional limits on police questioning under reasonable 
suspicion—that the police can ask for a name but the suspect need not 
answer.55 To support its rationale that the request for identity not 
become a legal nullity, the Court gives some general policy reasons 
divorced from the safety concerns in Terry: “identity may inform an 
officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of 
violence or mental disorder.”56 In Hiibel, the Court concludes that 
“[t]he officer’s request was a commonsense inquiry”57 and “was 
‘reasonably related in scope to the concern which justified’ the 
stop.”58 However, the scope and concern is not what justifies 
searches in Terry. Instead, Terry searches are limited to the officer’s 
safety.  
 
49 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (Justice White, 
concurring).  
50 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459, quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S 47, 53, n. 3 (“We 
need not decide whether an individual may be punished for refusing to identify 
himself in the context of a lawful investigatory stop which satisfies Fourth 
Amendment requirements.”). 
51 Id. at 2459. 
52 Supra note 20. 
53 Royer 460 U.S. at 497-8 (affirming Justice White’s contention in Terry that a 
suspect need not answer questions) 
54 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 729 n. 6 (1969) (noting the “settled principle” 
that police officers may not compel answers to questions about unsolved crimes). 
55 See supra 5-6 
56 Id. at 2458.   
57 Id. at 2460. 
58 Id. (quoting Terry at 20).   
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The Court maintains that “[t]he principles of Terry permit a State 
to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry 
stop.”59 In making this assertion, the Court ignores the security 
rationale in Terry; instead, the Court contends that the reasonableness 
of requiring a name passes the balancing test articulated in Delaware 
v. Prouse60 because the “request for identity has an immediate relation 
to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.”61 
However, as explained above, the purpose and rationale of the search 
permitted by a Terry stop is to ensure safety.  And the practical 
demands of the Terry decision were to ensure that the methods of the 
search do not violate the Fourth Amendment.   
As our analysis of the Terry majority and concurrences shows, the 
Terry Court took pains to set limits on what kinds of searches Terry 
allows, leaving latter opinions to determine the intricacies of the 
details regarding permissible and impermissible searches for 
weapons.62 So there is no question that the officer may not use the 
Terry stop to search for drugs or anything other than weapons.  The 
extension of the Terry search in Hiibel comes from new cloth, not 
Terry.63 
The limited scope of searches allowed on reasonable suspicion 
under Terry clarifies the faults of the Hiibel. Even assuming that the 
suspect in Hiibel poses a threat because of the police report, nothing 
in the Terry allows the officer to perform a search to determine that 
the suspect “is wanted for another offense.”  Furthermore, while a 
suspect with “a record of violence or mental disorder” might well 
pose an additional threat to an officer, nothing in Terry allows for an 
officer to make an inquiry into this issue on reasonable suspicion 
unless the suspect volunteers an answer.  Instead, what Terry allows 
for is a search for weapons. Because the Hiibel search was for 
 
59 Id., 2460. 
60 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
61 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459. 
62 Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (“We need not develop at length in this case, however, the 
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure and 
search for weapons.”) 
63 Drawing on case in which additional circumstances were present, one could argue 
that Terry permits searches for more than weapons; however, the Supreme Court 
cases that permit more intrusive searches all have added factors that increase the 
law enforcement interest or meet the Court’s “special needs” doctrine.  For 
example, Illinois v. Cabealles, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005) and U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675 (1985), concern searches of motor vehicles while U.S. v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) concern searches at boarder crossings and Florida 
v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) a consensual search.  See also supra note 44.     
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something different than weapons, it cannot be claimed to follow the 
precedent from Terry.
IV.  Kolender Analysis 
 
In Kolender, the Court held a statute requiring “credible and 
reliable” identification unconstitutional because the law was 
impermissably vague under the Due Process clause.64 While the 
Court did not reach the constitutional question of whether the statute 
violated the Fourth Amendment, Justice Brennan’s concurrence did.  
He stated that the Fourth Amendment prevents the police from 
compelling identification for crime prevention when the crime is 
unspecified.65 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Kolender,66 
as affirmed in Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd.,67 contradicts the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the “commonsense” inquiry into identity 
furthers the state interest in crime prevention that allows for Terry 
stops.   
In holding that the Nevada Gaming Control Board Agent acted 
unreasonably in interpreting the same Nevada law at issue in Hiibel,68 
the Ninth Circuit worried about a bootstrapping problem with 
Nevada’s stop and identify statute.69 Because a suspect can be Terry 
stopped for less than probable cause, an officer demanding 
identification and not getting it under a stop and identify statute could 
arrest a suspect on less than probable cause.70 Thus the situation in 
which a suspect is arrested on less than probable cause exists simply 
because a suspect does not sufficiently justify herself to the state: this 
gives the government a power the Ninth Circuit decided transgressed 
the constitutional foundations of the Fourth Amendment.71 To 
reiterate the point, the state now has the power to arrest a person 
 
64 461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
65 Id. at 362 (“Merely to facilitate the general law enforcement objectives of 
investigating and preventing unspecified crimes, States may not authorize the arrest 
and criminal prosecution of an individual for failing to produce identification or 
further information on demand by a police officer.”). 
66 Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981). 
67 Carey v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002). 
68 Id. at 882. 
69 Id. at 880.   
70 Id. (quoting Kolender, 658 F.2d at 1366-67).   
71 Id. at 881. 
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without meeting its obligation under the Fourth Amendment simply 
because the person detained chooses to withhold her name. 
Besides the bootstrapping problem, stop and identify statutes also 
represent the problem of “mission creep.”  If the officers initiating the 
Terry stop are not satisfied with the suspect’s name, the Terry stop 
will expand to satisfy the police.  However, such an investigation is 
prohibited by previous Court rulings.  Even allowing that compelling 
a name is permissible, follow-up questions to confirm the name would 
be impermissible because the police do not have the authority to 
compel answers to other questions.72 For example, the reasoning 
behind the Supreme Court’s finding in Kolender that a California 
law’s requirement for “credible and reliable” information “encourages 
arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with sufficient 
particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute.”73 
The same concerns apply for the Nevada stop and identify statute.  
Suppose an officer detains a suspect under a legitimate Terry stop.  
The officer asks for the suspect’s name.  A skillful criminal will not 
give the correct name because that might be incriminating, allowing 
the officer to make an arrest for an outstanding warrant.  A suspect 
with an unusual name, a nickname, or a name similar to a person with 
an outstanding arrest warrant might lead the officer to request more 
than a simple name.74 The only assistance the stop and identify 
statute offers police is for those suspects who give their real names 
and there is information in a police database linking that person to 
information that enables the officer to take the necessary precautions 
for safety.  The savvy criminal will simply give a false name to avoid 
a trap. 
Consider the situation in which the Court’s decision in Hiibel 
leaves us.  For the suspect with an unusual name, the officer might 
now desire credible information to ensure that the suspect is not lying.  
This puts the officer in clear violation of the Fourth Amendment 
because now the unusual name has caused the officer to seek 
credibility for the identification, a power that outstrips the officer’s 
 
72 See supra notes 21-24 an accompanying text.   
73 Kolender, 461 U.S at 361. 
74 Consider the situation that arises when a passenger name matches a name on the 
government’s “no fly” list.  The individual must then prove that she is not the 
person whose name appears on the government list.  So a simple request for a name 
can quickly become complicated.  Leigh A. Kite, Note Red Flagging Civil Liberties 
and Due Process Rights of Airline Passengers: Will a Redesigned CAPPS II System 
Meet the Constitutional Challenge? 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1385, 1421-22 
(2004).     
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authority under Kolendar. Alternately, for the suspect who lies, the 
officer has no capacity to determine that the suspect is lying without 
“credible and reliable” identification.  Thus, without verifying the 
identity offered by the suspect, the stop and identify statute is of 
extremely limited use to law enforcement.  So, in the name of crime 
control, the next case under the Hiibel decision will concern the steps 
officers can take to verify the identity offered unless the Court 
withdraws the power granted in Hiibel. 
Under Hiibel, the Court recognized a law enforcement interest in 
ensuring a suspect is not “wanted for another offense, or has a record 
of violence or mental disorder” to facilitate police safety.   For police 
to further the interests identified in Hiibel, the identity a suspect offers 
must be credible.  For the identity to be reliable, it must be backed up 
by more than the suspect’s attestation that the name is correct.  Thus 
the officer, in advancing the law enforcement interests in Hiible, will 
ask for proof of identification, bringing Hiibel into conflict with 
Kolender. Considering how Hiibel made short work of Terry, we 
have no assurance that the protections against requiring people to 
produce “credible and reliable” identification from Kolender will 
stand.  Indeed, Kolender is on a collision course with Hiibel. Because 
of the prospect that police will demand IDs and criminals lie, the 
Court’s agenda that the request for a name “not become a legal 
nullity”75 speaks in favor of allowing a requirement for “credible and 
reliable” identification.   
Thus the Ninth Circuit’s worry in Carey that stop and identify 
statutes will allow suspects to be arrested on less than probable cause 
is the natural result of the Court’s crime prevention and safety 
interests upon which the Hiibel decision is predicated.  If the suspect 
has an unusual name, the suspect could be asked for credible 
identification; failure to produce that identification could lead to an 
arrest on less than probable cause.  The “commonsense” need for 
police to ensure that names are reliable is just a case away from 
allowing the police to arrest suspects on less than probable cause for 
failure to produce reliable identification.  So the Court’s policy 
interest in Hiibel, if followed, would allow the police to arrest on less 
than probable cause for failure to possess the right kind of name or 
produce the right kind of ID.  In short, this renders Terry stops 
identity checkpoints that can bootstrap an arrest on less than probable 
cause.   
 
75 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459. 
TROUBLES WITH HIIBEL 
 
18
V.  Identity Checkpoints and the Constitution 
 
Identity checkpoints are at odds with basic liberties in the United 
States.  Travel and freedom of movement are basic freedoms under 
the Constitution,76 recognized in Chicago v. Morales77 and Terry as 
falling under the First Amendment.  An identity checkpoint inhibits 
freedom of movement because citizens are required to disclose their 
identity in circumstances in which they have not broken the law and 
do not want their identity known.  Requiring citizens to do so, even 
under reasonable suspicion, results in a chilling effect on freedom of 
movement, violating the privacy of those who wish to travel 
anonymously, thus violating the right to travel.  
Calling the request for a name predicated on reasonable suspicion 
an identity checkpoint is not hyperbole.  The term fits because the 
kind of search allowed by Terry prior to Hiibel was predicated on the 
officer’s safety.  Hiibel extends beyond what falls under the officer’s 
safety to purposes that give the police more power against suspects.  
While it certainly is true that allowing identity checks predicated on 
reasonable suspicion could facilitate law enforcement, law 
enforcement cannot advance at the expense of a constitutional right.  
A seminal example of this is Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Court 
held that evidence obtained in custodial investigations when 
defendant has not been advised of rights and privileges against self-
incrimination is inadmissible.78 Citizens have a fundamental right to 
go about their lives without having to justify themselves to 
government.  This is what a right to privacy affords—“the right to be 
let alone.”79 Hiibel authorizes a police power to violate this right. 
 
76 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999) (“The word ‘travel’ is not found in text of 
the Constitution.  Yet the ‘constitutional right to travel from one State to another’ is 
firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 
(1969) (“[The right to travel] is a right broadly assertable against private 
interference as well as government action.  Like the right of association, NAACP v. 
Alabama, it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the 
Constitution to us all.” (citations omitted)).  Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 
(1958) (“The right to travel is part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be 
deprived without due process under the Fifth Amendment.”).  The Articles of 
Confederation also provided for freedom of travel in Article IV: “and the people of 
each State shall free ingress and regress to and from any other State.” 
77 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999). 
78 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
79 Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890).  See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (J. Brandeis, 
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When discussing the government intrusion into the lives of 
citizens, Justice Kennedy says that a request for identity “is likely to 
be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only 
in unusual circumstances.”80 Here Justice Kennedy’s speculation on 
what is significant is misplaced.  While for some the disclosure of a 
name is may be insignificant, for others the disclosure is the 
beginning of significant consequences.  For those for whom the 
disclosure is significant, if the disclosure violates the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, then the Constitution 
protects the individual to refrain from disclosing the information 
unless the state offers immunity.   Had Office Dove learned that the 
alleged assault he was investigating involved two Hiibels—Dudley 
and his daughter—Hiibel’s name would have served as evidence of a 
relationship subject to Nevada’s domestic violence laws.  In Nevada, 
when there is probable cause to believe that domestic battery has 
occurred, Nevada law requires arrest of the suspect unless mitigating 
circumstances are present.81 Thus Hiibel’s situation was exactly the 
situation Justice Kennedy erroneously thought he had deferred to the 
next case: Hiibel’s fulfillment of Officer Dove’s demand for a name 
would constitute a “disclosure that the witness reasonably believes 
could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other 
evidence that might so be used.”82 
But even in the absence of incriminating circumstances the 
compelled disclosure of a name violates the Constitution.  The 
 
dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's 
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the 
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They 
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their 
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone -- 
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”). 
80 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2461.   
81 Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 171.137 (1) (Except as otherwise provided in subsection 
2, whether or not a warrant has been issued, a peace officer shall, unless mitigating 
circumstances exist, arrest a person when he has probable cause to believe that the 
person to be arrested has, within the preceding 24 hours, committed a battery upon 
his spouse, former spouse, any other person to whom he is related by blood or 
marriage, a person with whom he is or was actually residing, a person with whom 
he has had or is having a dating relationship, a person with whom he has a child in 
common, the minor child of any of those persons or his minor child.)  See Brief for 
Petitioner at 37, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, Humboldt County, 124 
S.Ct 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554) (discussing the relationship between Nevada’s 
domestic violence law (Nev. Rev. Stat. 33.018) and self-incrimination).  
82 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2454 (citation omitted.)   
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fundamental right a legally sanctioned demand for a name predicated 
on the threat of arrest implicates extends beyond the enumerated 
rights specified in the Constitution.  According to an enumerated 
rights analysis, the only rights that the Constitution protects are those 
rights specified in the text.  Of course, contrary to Justice Scalia’s 
protestations,83 the Supreme Court does not engage in strict 
enumerated rights analysis, for ours is a constitution of reserved rights 
and enumerated powers.  Instead, another tradition of constitutional 
interpretation claims there are rights related to those enumerated in 
the Constitution, which exist because the exercise of the enumerated 
rights cannot occur without the exercise of unenumerated rights; these 
are embodied in general notions like liberty and substantive due 
process.  The locus classicus of privacy literature captures this more 
fruitful way of understanding rights in the Constitution:  
[I]n very early times, the law gave a remedy only for 
physical interference with life and property, for 
trespass vi et armis. Then the “right to life” served 
only to protect the subject from battery in its various 
forms; liberty meant freedom from actual constraint; 
and the right to property secured the individual his 
lands and his cattle.  Later, there came a recognition of 
man’s spiritual nature, his feelings and his intellect.  
Gradually the scope of these rights broadened; and 
now the right to life has come to mean the right to 
enjoy life,—the right to be let alone; the right to liberty 
secures the exercise of extensive civil privileged; and 
the term “property” has grown to comprise every form 
of possession—intangible as well as tangible.84 
The tradition of finding rights in the Constitution other than those 
enumerate employed in previous decisions like Wolf v. Colorado85 
83 Justice Scalia is a vocal and sophisticated proponent of this view.  Consider his 
comments in Lawrence v. Texas: “But there is no right to ‘liberty’ under the Due 
Process Clause, though today’s opinion repeated makes that claim.” 539 U.S. 558, 
591 (2003) (J. Scalia, dissenting.)  A consequence of Scalia’s view is that a state 
can, through the democratic process, outlaw anything not specifically stated in the 
constitution.   See also SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, ed. Amy Gutmann 
(1998). 
84 The Right to Privacy, supra note 79.   
85 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion 
by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free 
society.”). 
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and NAACP v. Alabama,86 reached maturity in Justice Douglas’s 
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut. There, Douglas said that “the 
First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from 
government intrusion.”87 Locating a right like privacy in the First 
Amendment is predicated on the notion that privacy is required for the 
First Amendment to be meaningful.  Through the unfolding of 
history, the Court found the First Amendment afforded more 
protections than those captured in a simple reading of the text and 
what the Framers thought the text meant.  The Court has used this 
method to ensure that the Constitution captures the conceptual import 
of notions like freedom of association instead of limiting the terms to 
an understanding to what the individual writers actually thought at the 
time the Constitution was written.88 For example, even though some 
drafters of the Constitution and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments did not hold opinions about Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine 
of “separate but equal,” a full understanding of the Constitution 
allowed Brown v. Board of Education to overturn this unfortunate 
result.89 
Without privacy, an individual’s ability to express unpopular 
views, join controversial organization, or support unpopular causes is 
inhibited.  The consequences an unrestrained majority might visit 
upon those expressing minority views leads those expressing the 
unpopular views to do so privately.  Without the protection privacy 
affords, the majority can more easily chill free speech.  Reading 
privacy into the Constitution best captures how to understand the 
implications of the concepts the Framers employed when writing the 
Constitution.     
 
86 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“This Court has recognized the vital relationship 
between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations.”). 
87 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).   
88 In the literature, this way of interpreting the constitution is ably defended by 
Ronald Dworkin: “If we are trying to make best sense of the Framers speaking as 
they did in the context in which they spoke, we should conclude that they intended 
to lay down abstract not dated commands and prohibitions. The Framers were 
careful statesmen who knew how to use the language they spoke. We cannot make 
good sense of their behavior unless we assume that they meant to say what people 
who use the words they used would normally mean to say--that they used abstract 
language because they intended to state abstract principles. They are best 
understood as making a constitution out of abstract moral principles, not coded 
references to their own opinions (or those of their contemporaries) about the best 
way to apply those principles.”  The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, 
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249, 1253 (1997) 
89 347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
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Consider the Court’s opinion in NAACP v. Alabama, in which the 
state of Alabama wanted to obtain the membership roles of the 
NAACP.  Relying on decisions in previous opinions such as Schware 
v. Board of Examiners, the Court recognized that the First 
Amendment also protects the right to freedom of association, even 
though the First Amendment does not specifically mention 
association.90 Taking the next step in NAACP v. Alabama, Justice 
Harlan authored a unanimous opinion for the Court linking 
association and privacy: “This Court has recognized the vital 
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s 
associations.  …Inviolability of privacy in group associations may in 
many circumstances be indispensable to freedom of association, 
particularly where a group espoused dissident beliefs.”91 By linking 
the right to privacy with the First Amendment the Court raised the 
level of scrutiny to which any state action abridging the right to 
privacy is subject.  Although Justice Douglas does refer to NAACP v. 
Alabama in linking privacy to the First Amendment, the case does not 
provide much guidance when the state has a legitimate purpose since 
Alabama did not advance a legitimate state purpose for acquiring the 
NAACP membership roles.   
Drawing on the method used in NAACP v Alabama, Griswold v. 
Connecticut found a Connecticut law banning the sale of 
contraceptive devices unconstitutional.  In his majority opinion, 
Douglas mined past cases to show how rights implicit within those 
enumerated in the Constitution have been recognized in past cases 
and used to strike down state laws that abridge those rights.  For 
example, he referred to cases like Pierce v. Society of Sisters92 and 
Meyer v. Nebraska93 to show that the First Amendment protected the 
right for parents to choose schools for their children and the right for 
the study of the German language in private schools: These are all 
rights not enumerated in the First Amendment yet they are recognized 
by the Court as penumbral protections under the First Amendment.  
While these rights derived from the conceptual and practical 
implications of the enumerated right may be peripheral rights,   
prohibiting peripheral right infringes on the enumerated right: 
 
90 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).   
91 357 U.S. at 462. 
92 268 U.S. 510 (holding that parents have the right to send their children to private 
schools instead of public schools). 
93 262 U.S. 390 (holding that parents have the right to choose that their children are 
taught German in private schools). 
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“Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less 
secure.”94 
By referring to these past decisions, Douglas established that the 
rights enumerated in the Constitution do not stand on there own; 
rather, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life 
and substance.”95 Of particular importance for Douglas’s opinion are 
what he called the “zones of privacy” created by the First 
Amendment.96 A zone of privacy covers an aspect of a citizen’s life, 
protecting that domain from government inquiry unless the citizen 
allows the disclosure.97 In Griswold, Douglas found a zone of privacy 
for the marital relationship: “Would we allow the police to search the 
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of 
contraceptives?  The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship.”98 Therefore the Court ruled 
that the Connecticut law banning the sale of contraceptives intruded 
upon this private relationship and was therefore unconstitutional.  
The unifying idea for all of these recognitions of privacy is an 
even more basic idea that the majority in Terry affirmed: 
this Court has always recognized, “No right is held 
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the 
common law, than the right of every individual to the 
possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law.”99 
The right to be left alone is the foundation unifying the zones of 
privacy found in the Bill of Rights; individual rights enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights are particular manifestations of these rights.  Its 
persistence is undermined by the power not to let persons alone.   
The Court has extended the privacy rights identified in Griswold 
to the nondisclosure of information.  This right began in NAACP v. 
Alabama, allowing the NAACP to refuse to release its membership 
 
94 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83.   
95 Id. at 479.   
96 Id. at 484 (“Various guarantees create zones of privacy.  The right of association 
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.”). 
97 Likewise, in the Miranda decision, the Court recognized that custodial 
interrogations require informing a prisoner of the right to remain silent even though 
the Constitution provides no such requirement in the text.  But the Fifth Amendment 
protects against self-incrimination.  See infra note 119.     
98 Id. at 485-86. 
99 392 U.S. at 8 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
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roles.  After Griswold, Whalen v. Roe100 and United States 
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom101 
affirmed the existence of this right to nondisclosure.  This is line of 
jurisprudence under which Hiibel fails: There is a right to 
nondisclosure for private matters.  The state cannot inquire into an 
individual’s private business under the threat of arrest without 
probable cause.  A name is private because it relates the identity of a 
person to a private matter the person is undertaking, e.g., a political 
gathering.  Any effort to learn a citizen’s name through identity 
checkpoints, absent probable cause, is a constitutional violation.  But 
this unconstitutional result is exactly what Hiibel allows.  In the next 
section, we provide a further exploration of the importance of a name 
to an individual’s liberty as protected by the Constitution.       
 
VI. What’s in a Name? 
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy seems perplexed about 
why Hiibel did not want to disclose his name to the police: “Even 
today, petitioner does not explain how the disclosure of his name was 
none of the officer’s business.”102 This analysis assumes that Hiibel,
perhaps as in the necessity to invoke the Fifth Amendment in court or 
in Congress, has a positive duty to explain why he does not want to 
disclose his name.  There are many reasons someone might not want 
to disclose a name, and it should not be incumbent upon a citizen to 
provide a reason for failing to do so to the officer or the Court absent 
probable cause.  Instead, after recognizing the constitutional right 
entitling the suspect not to have their privacy invaded, what the law 
should do is set policy to err on the side of protecting the 
constitutional right.  Indeed, since our Constitution embodies this 
general policy interest, it is the duty of the Court to ensure that laws 
do not illegitimately infringe on that constitutional right.  This is the 
 
100 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977) (“The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 
"privacy" have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests.  One is the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”).  (footnote omitted.) 
101 489 U.S. 749, 767 (1988) (“In addition to the common-law and dictionary 
understandings, the basic difference between scattered bits of criminal history and a 
federal compilation, federal statutory provisions, and state policies, our cases have 
also recognized the privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of certain 
information even where the information may have been at one time public.”). 
102 Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2461.  
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process of judicial review has been the raison d’etre of the Court 
since Marbury v. Madison.103 
Recognizing the place of a policy interest preventing the 
disclosure of a name under reasonable suspicion begins by realizing 
the importance of anonymity in the founding of the United States.  
The history of this country began with the founders using 
pseudonyms for political purposes.  For example, during “the first 
twenty years of American constitutional government, six men who 
would later be president wrote under pen names.”104 The Court has 
stated that the “tradition [of anonymity in support of political causes] 
is most famously embodied in the Federalist Papers, authored by 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, but signed 
‘Publius.’”105 The need for anonymity to separate the opinion from 
the person expressing the view is known to the Court and anyone who 
votes: 
[There is] a respected tradition of anonymity in the 
advocacy of political causes.  This tradition is perhaps 
best exemplified by the secret ballot, the hard-won 
right to vote one’s conscience without fear of 
retaliation.106 
The Court’s concern to allow people to separate their identity 
from unpopular opinions has manifested itself in numerous opinions: 
For example, in Brown v. Socialist Workers’ 74 Campaign
Comm., the Court said that the ‘‘Constitution protects
against the compelled disclosure of political associations.’’107
The Court did so because ‘‘[s]uch disclosures ‘can seriously 
infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First 
Amendment’.”108 In NAACP v. Alabama the Court made the same 
point.109 Likewise, in Bates v. City of Little Rock, the Court
held that the NAACP did not have to disclose membership
lists.110 In making its ruling, the Court noted that freedom of
103 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
104 JOHN W. JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT: BIRTH CONTROL AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY (2005) at 55. 
105 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343, note 6 (1995). 
106 Id. at 342-43 (quoting Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 62 (1960) (citations 
omitted).     
107 459 U.S. 87, 91 (1982).
108 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976), citing Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)). 
109 See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text. 
110 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
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association and freedom of speech ‘‘are protected not only against 
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more 
subtle governmental interference.”111 Finally, in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, Justice Black’s concurring
opinion noted the fear that dominate groups will suppress
deviant views and his hope in the constitution to prevent
such injustices.112
In short, the Court has recognized that compelling the disclosure 
of identity can chill the exercise of civil liberties.   
We are not unmindful that the damage done by 
disclosure to the associational interests of the minor 
parties and their members and to supporters of 
independents could be significant. These movements 
are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus 
are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In 
some instances fears of reprisals may deter 
contributions to the point where the movement cannot 
survive. The public interest also suffers if that result 
comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in 
the free circulation of ideas both within and without 
the political arena.”113 
If those in power can link the speech they do not like with the 
person who speaks then those with power can use their authority to 
make life more difficult for the speaker: “The evidence offered need 
show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a 
party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or 
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.”114 The 
Court has recognized this as a general policy concern behind the First 
Amendment.115 As such, there is no need for the speaker in a 
particular case to explain why he or she desires to keep his or her 
identity secret; instead, the Court recognizes that people sometimes 
do want to keep their persons secret, and allowing the government to 
 
111 Id. at 523.
112 341 U.S. 123, 145 (1951) (Black, J., concurring) (‘‘In this day when 
prejudice, hate and fear are constantly invoked to justify irresponsible smears and 
persecution of persons even faintly suspected of entertaining unpopular views, it 
may be futile to suggest that the cause of internal security would be fostered, not 
hurt, by faithful adherence to our constitutional guarantees of individual liberty.”). 
113 Brown, 459 U.S. at 93 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976)).
114 Id. at (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74). 
115 Id. 
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compel the speaker’s identity would chill citizens’ exercise of their 
liberties.   
There may be policy concerns that the state might advance by 
requiring citizens to disclose their identities to police.  For example, 
requiring writers to disclose their identities would promote 
responsible authorship.  If authors had to sign their names to 
everything they wrote, there would fewer false statements printed.116 
Of course, such a policy decision has a cost, and the cost would be the 
suppression of important political speech critical of those in power 
anonymity facilitates.  This is a cost that the Court has previously 
understood the Constitution holds as more important than the social 
good of fewer false publications.117 
Laws that compel citizens to identify themselves on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion fail under a similar analysis.  To be sure, 
compelling citizens to identify themselves would help law 
enforcement.  Stopping a suspect on reasonable suspicion and 
eliciting the suspect’s identity could result in an arrest because of an 
outstanding warrant.  Likewise, learning that a suspect stopped on 
reasonable suspicion has previously assaulted police officers would 
allow officers to take additional steps to ensure their own safety, 
another legitimate policy concern.  While arresting those with 
outstanding arrest warrants and informing police when additional 
safety measures are worthy goals, such a goals cannot be pursued if 
they illegitimately transgresses a civil liberty under the Constitution.  
And this is precisely what laws compelling suspects to disclose their 
identity do.  Consider again the domestic violence example in which 
merely providing a name is incriminating when the last name matches 
the victim’s because it is evidence of a domestic relationship.118 And, 
pace Justice Kennedy, this was exactly the case in Hiibel.119 
116 This motivation was given by the City of Los Angeles in Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960).  In that case, a city ordinance requiring the names and 
addresses of those who prepare handbills printed upon the handbills.  The Court 
struck down the city ordinance, noting that anonymity serves a vital political 
purpose in promoting Free Speech: “Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and 
even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted 
groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize 
oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.”  Id. at 64. 
117 Id.
118 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.     
119 Indeed, the question Justice Kennedy thought he could defer was manifest: “Still, 
a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the 
time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to 
convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider 
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Even ignoring the specific transgression of the Fifth Amendment 
in this case, the Hiibel inverts the fundamental relationship between 
the government and the governed under our Constitution.  The error 
in Justice Kennedy’s analysis of Hiibel’s complaint begins exactly 
when he asks why Hiibel did not want to disclose his name.  The 
analysis recognizes that suspects have no duty to disclose their 
identity regardless of the consequences.  The constitutional 
protections afforded through free speech protections do not require 
that anyone justify herself to the state unless the state has already 
satisfied its burden of probable cause; namely, that the individual in 
question is a threat to others and must be deprived of liberty.  
Probable cause is the standard for satisfying this burden.  Reasonable 
suspicion has been carved out by Terry for allowing a lower standard 
of proof for briefly detaining suspects for a limited search for 
weapons for the officer’s safety and questions that the suspect need 
not answer.120 Placing any duty on citizens to disclose their identities 
hinders free speech.121 In asking the question about why Hiibel does 
not want to disclose his name, Justice Kennedy gets the relationship 
between citizens and the state exactly backwards.  Hiibel does not 
have to justify himself to the state and the state cannot take action 
against him unless it has compelling justification.  From silence alone 
the state is not entitled to infer probable cause for an arrest.122 
Of course, as Holmes’ cliché about not shouting fire in a crowded 
theater when there is no fire indicates, free speech has limits.123 
However, what this truism recognizes is a specific exception to the 
 
whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what 
remedy must follow. We need not resolve those questions here.”  Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. 
at 2461. 
120 See supra 7 – 10.  
121 Of course, any positive duty to disclose identity would also violate their Fourth 
Amendment right preventing unlawful search and seizure and Fifth Amendment 
right against self incrimination.  Like the right to free speech, these rights also cast 
their shadows on privacy—the right to be left alone.   
122 For a discussion of how the right to remain silent in the First and Fifth 
Amendments combine with the Fourth Amendment prohibitions against 
unreasonable searches to render law compelling the possession and presentation of 
identification unconstitutional, see Sobel, supra note 25 at 372-73. 
123 Justice Holmes asserted this in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  
Later, the Court modified Schenck in Brandenberg v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 444 (1969) 
(stating that speech can only be barred when it was direct and likely to incite 
imminent lawlessness).  In Schenck, Holmes majority opinion compared distributing 
flyers opposing the draft in World War I to shouting fire in a crowded theater.  
Critics of Holmes’ opinion contended that the flyers were intended to keep people 
out of the raging fire in Europe.   
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general right.  Specific exceptions to general rights are permissible in 
light of a recognizable threat; people panic to cries of fire, so the law 
tries to reduce a likely harm.  In contrast, the Nevada law picks out no 
specific threat.  To justify the law, the Supreme Court imagines 
hypothetical threats that would only exists in special conditions with 
certain suspects, not conditions that exists with any crowded theater.  
Restrictions on fundamental rights like free speech require specific 
threats that trigger unthinking responses, and these are the restrictions 
the law embodies.124 Under Hiibel, the police need not find any 
specific threat to hinder free speech; instead, under Hiibel the chilling 
effect is unchecked.   
Laws like Nevada’s stop and identify statute that permit the state 
to arrest citizens on the basis of reasonable suspicion for not 
identifying themselves puts citizens in the position of having to 
identify themselves to authorities when they would rather travel or 
express themselves anonymously.  Recognizing the nature of 
restraints the Court previously upheld for free speech permits an 
understanding of the inherent criticisms leveled against laws that 
allow police to arrest citizens who do not identify themselves:  
As an impressionable lad growing up in the '40s in a 
sleepy Wisconsin burg where the local cinema was the 
principal source of amusement, I consumed a steady 
diet of World War II movies, where I saw essentially 
the same scene time and again: in some area under the 
Nazi thumb, some hapless traveler would be stopped 
by the authorities, at which point the man in charge 
would inevitably say, "Ve vant to zee your papers." 
The traveler would produce his credentials and then 
would be subjected to a thorough grilling about where 
he was going, where he had been, why he was about, 
etc. Each time I watched such a scene, shivers went 
down my spine, and it was then that I concluded that 
one of the most striking differences between a free and 
a totalitarian society was that in the former scenes like 
 
124 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (Government regulation of speech must 
address a real, not hypothetical, harm and must directly mitigate that harm.); 
NAACP v. Clairtowne Hardware Co., Miss., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); see also 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (explaining that “‘fighting 
words’—‘those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace’ are not protected by the constitution.”).  Even though 
the ‘fighting words’ doctrine is regarded as dead, this is a more towards allowing speech 
and does not affect the point, for the point is that restrictions on speech require a specific 
threat.   
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that could not happen. We certainly have come a long 
way, unfortunately in the wrong direction!125 
With this sentiment, Michigan law Professor LaFave laments the 
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights to law enforcement.  As we have 
argued, the rights enumerated in the amendments are conceptually 
related to each other and others based on the unenumerated rights like 
the right to privacy.  Furthermore, the First, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments and the conceptually related unenumerated rights 
provide protections against identity checkpoints.  Against the First 
Amendment, identity checkpoints intrude on free speech for the sake 
of an unspecified threat.  Anyone traveling to an unpopular event, 
perhaps an event that many members of the local community do not 
support, would fear the consequences of linking identity with 
unpopular views.  The chilling effect that such laws have on First 
Amendment rights runs counter to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  
As such, we know why identity checkpoints send “shivers” down our 
spines—they resonate with a regime that we have to justify ourselves 
to, not a state that must justify itself to its citizens.126 Democratic 
government derives from the consent of the governed, not the other 
way around. 
Thus Justice Kennedy’s demand that Hiibel do more than affirm 
that his identification was not the police’s business is misguided.  It is 
not the place of the Court to engage in an exercise weighing the 
amount of a fundamental right that can be restricted for the sake of a 
hypothetical threat.  Instead, the Court should have followed its 
rational for other infringements on First and Fourth Amendment 
rights by prohibiting restrictions absent a real, specified threat 
actually related to the restriction.   
 
VII. Conclusion: The Bright-line 
 
Arguing that the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments prohibit 
laws that compel citizens to identify themselves on reasonable 
 
125 Wayne R. LaFave, The ‘Routine Traffic Stop’ From Start to Finish: Too Much 
‘Routine,’ Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1890-91 
(2004). 
126 For another take on this difference with reference to the Fifth Amendment, see 
Privacy Activism, amicus brief for Hiibel, available at 
http://www.abditum.com/hiibel/pdf/privacyactivism_amicus.pdf, (last visited Feb. 
27, 2006) at 5-6.   
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suspicion, the analysis here of the First Amendment parallels previous 
approaches to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.127 For all of these 
accounts, the proper remedy is a bright-line that prohibits the state to 
compel a citizen to provide a name unless the person has been 
identified as a specific threat to the state on the basis of probable 
cause.   
Justice Kennedy’s questionable assertion that a request for 
identification is less intrusive than a frisk for weapons allowed the 
Court to transgress a fundamental right persons possess under the 
Constitution.  However, the “commonsense” obtrusive nature of the 
intrusion is not what is significant.  Instead, what matters is that a 
weapons frisk under reasonable suspicion is predicated on a threat to 
the officer’s safety; officers undertaking a Terry weapons frisk cannot 
use any information gained in those frisks to arrest citizens except for 
contraband discovered through “plain-feel.”128 A bright-line existed 
between what Terry said the officer could do for safety and any 
additional inquiry: The officer could ask, but the suspect may remain 
silent.  Hiibel erases that bright-line, inverting the constitutional 
relationship, by empowering the state to employ the force of law to 
compel citizens to give information to the police, presenting citizens 
with a state that can intrude further on their rights under the 
Constitution.  
The Court needs to reestablish the line that existed before Hiibel.
Taking away the ability of the state to compel citizens to identify 
themselves will restore the rights courts should recognize under the 
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.  Restoring this line will allow 
citizens to express their First Amendment rights to silence without 
having to fear repercussions for not being able to comport themselves 
anonymously.  Moreover, maintaining the line will help ensure that 
the proper balance between citizens and the state under the 
Constitution; the government will have to justify itself to citizens 
instead of improperly conscripting the citizens to incriminate 
themselves under state powers. 
 
127 See, for example, Shelli Calland, Hiibel v. Sixth Judiciary District Court: Stop 
and Identify Statues Do Not Violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments 40 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 251 (2005) (arguing for the restoration of the bright-line rule 
from Terry).  Our analysis goes beyond Calland’s timely article by linking the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations with the First Amendment and the general 
structure of the Bill of Rights.   
128 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.   
